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Licensing, and Administrative Procedure Acts
Homer W. Giles*
L ICENSING LAWS HAVE PROVED to be very effective govern-
mental regulatory devices. Although the supposed purpose
of government in requiring a license for a particular activity is
to regulate, "by a general formal denial of a right, which is then
made individually available by an administrative act of approval,
certification, consent or permit,"' the effect in many cases is
actually to prohibit.2
While government should be permitted to prohibit activities
which it regards with disfavor, it should not be permitted to
allow an administrative agency to deprive a person of a license
for a business or occupation, otherwise lawful, without giving
that person an opportunity to challenge the appropriateness of
the order of the administrative body in a proceeding before a
properly constituted judicial court. Yet that has been the practice
in many states, and was the law in Ohio, in some instances, prior
to the passage of the Ohio Administrative Procedure Act.3 In
some states it has even been held that revocation of a license may
be effected without notice or hearing.4
The licensing process has proved effective because the bur-
den of proof is upon the party seeking the license, rather than
on the government. It is incumbent upon the applicant to demon-
strate that he qualifies for the license. As a result the licensing
process can be an instrument of prohibition and restraint. The
administrative agency or official charged with responsibility for
processing applications and issuing licenses has the power,
initially at least, to delay and discourage, and perhaps in some
cases even to prohibit, the issuance of a license or permit.
* Law Clerk to the Ohio Court of Appeals, 8th District; A. B., LL.B.,
Western Reserve University; and member of the Ohio Bar.
1 Freund, "Licensing," 1 Encyc. Soc. Sci. 447-451 (1933); Freund, Adminis-
trative Powers Over Persons and Property 140-174, ch. VII (1928).
2 See discussion in Davis on Administrative Law, 250-254 (1951).
3 See, The State, ex rel. Zugravu v. O'Brien, 130 Ohio St. 23, 3 0. 0. 74,
196 N. E. 664 (1935), where the court held that the Liquor Control Act,
which permitted a revocation of a liquor permit by the Board of Liquor
Control without providing for recourse to the courts by appeal or error,
was a proper exercise of the police power of the State, and did not
amount to a denial of due process of law.
4 Nulter v. State Road Commission, 119 W. Va. 312, 317, 318, 193 S. E. 549,
552 (1937).
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The import and scope of licensing processes have become
increasingly significant. There are few residents of any state who
do not require a state license for some purpose. It is usually
necessary to obtain a license to hunt or fish, to drive or own an
automobile or truck, or to engage in the practice of a profession.
If a person has a retail establishment he must secure a vendor's
license; and if he sells certain merchandise or services, which are
subject to special taxes, such as beer, wine or liquor, cigarettes,
or gasoline, or engages in horse racing or runs an eating place,
to mention a few examples, he must obtain the proper license or
permit. If a person wishes to form a corporation or an association,
or to organize charitable activities, he must secure the approval
of the proper administrative agency.5 Again, if a person conducts
a business which is subject to sanitary or safety laws, such as the
manufacture of soft drinks, baked goods, or ice cream, the sale
of milk, seeds, or fertilizer, or the manufacture of explosives, he
must secure the requisite state license. In addition, he must also
concern himself with licenses or permits which are required by
the various counties and municipalities of the state.
The licensing process has become a powerful administrative
device for regulation and law enforcement. With its growth
have come the expected attendant abuses. Ohio, however, like
other states, has become increasingly aware of the necessity of
completely revising its original licensing process. To this end,
the Ohio Legislature appointed an Administrative Law Commis-
sion5 to study the problems of administrative law and licensing
and to make recommendations.
The Administrative Law Commission stated, in its report,
that in 1940 there were 187 different types of state licenses,
administered by 47 different administrative agencies, under 76
separate licensing acts. 7 It is important to note that most of
these licenses have been created in the last twenty-five years.
The State of Ohio, in 1940, issued more than 8,337,000 li-
censes." Eighty per cent of this total was accounted for by the
various licenses, certificates and permits required with the sale
5 See, Oleck, Non-Profit Corporations and Associations, Sees. 10-16 (1956).
6 Administrative Law Commission created in 1941 by the 94th General
Assembly of Ohio.
7 Report of the Administrative Law Commission to the Governor and
General Assembly of the State of Ohio, pages 8-9, December 13, 1942.
8 Report of the Administrative Law Commission of Ohio to the Governor
and General Assembly, pgs. 38-39 (1945).
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and operation of motor vehicles. Hunting and fishing licenses
accounted for another fourteen per cent of the total. The other
eight per cent, or approximately one half million licenses, of 161
varying kinds, were issued by 45 different state administrative
agencies. There is no doubt that this total is far greater today.
Each year more and more persons are being confronted by
this regulatory device. For example, Ohio now requires the fol-
lowing professions and occupations to be licensed: accountants,
architects, barbers, beer distributors, boiler inspectors, brewery
manufacturers, chiropractors, cocktail dealers, cold storage ware-
housemen, commercial canners, cosmetologists, cosmetology in-
structors, dentists, dental hygienists, distilling manufacturers,
dry cleaners, elevator inspectors, embalmers, engineers and sur-
veyors, fair concessionaires, frozen desserts manufacturers,
funeral directors, highball manufacturers, hospital service agents,
hotel keepers, lawyers, liquid fuel dealers, livestock agents, live-
stock dealers and brokers, manicurists, midwives, milk weighers,
mine foremen, mine fire bosses, minnow dealers, motor trans-
portation agents, movie film exhibitors, notaries, nursery stock
dealers, nursery stock agents, nurses, optometrists, osteopaths,
pharmacists, physicians and surgeons, plumbing inspectors, real
estate brokers and salesmen, restaurant operators, sacramental
wine distributors, sales tax vendors, security dealers, soft drink
manufacturers and bottlers, steam boiler and engine operators,
teachers, veterinarians, wine dealers and bottlers, wine dis-
tributors and winery manufacturers.
Nor is this list exhaustive, for each session of the legislature
changes and adds to the number. The legislature also has been
inclined to shorten the time for which licenses are issued, thus
adding to the burdens of persons already affected by this con-
venient method of regulation.
The Commission found that while the licensing acts of Ohio
generally permitted the agencies administering the acts to adopt
rules and regulations, the extent of this rule-making power,
other than that such rules or regulations should be reasonable
and not inconsistent with law, was not ordinarily defined. Except
for this minor impediment, the rules and regulations promul-
gated by the agencies had the force of law. Yet the Commission's
report showed that these rules and regulations could be and
usually were adopted, amended, and rescinded, without public
notice before or after action was taken by the agencies, and
that they were ordinarily adopted, amended, and rescinded
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without opportunity for a hearing for those most concerned. The
Commission found that in many instances the rules and regula-
tions were not published and that those licensed were not fur-
nished copies of the rules and regulations governing them,
although violations of such rules might be a misdemeanor, or
result in a revocation of their license.
Generally these rules and regulations became effective with-
out affording a licensee time to become acquainted with them,
or to test their validity, until after being charged or found guilty
of violating them. Licensees are further mystified by the failure
of most agencies to publish their organizational structure and
procedure. A licensee, in some instances, would not even know
where the office of an agency was located.9
The safeguards recommended by the Commission concerned:
(1) a fixed type of notice prior to the adoption of a rule or
regulation; (2) an opportunity for interested persons to express
their views on a proposed rule or regulation; and (3) that full
information on all rules and regulations be available to any
interested person on request.
The Commission study of hearings held by the licensing
agencies of the State revealed that: (1) many of the licensing
acts failed to provide for a hearing on the revocation, suspen-
sion, refusal to issue or renew a license; (2) in those acts which
did contemplate a hearing, such procedural essentials as notice,
record and the attendance of witnesses were not ordinarily pro-
vided for; and (3) the procedures for hearings established by
the licensing acts lacked any semblance of uniformity. The Com-
mission felt that any person who desired a hearing should have
the opportunity whenever any agency revoked, suspended, re-
fused to issue, or refused to renew a license, and that such hear-
ing should be conducted according to accepted standards of
procedural fair play."0 The Commission also found great di-
versity in rules governing appeals. Many acts made no provi-
sion for appeal." Also, the grounds for appeal were various and
sundry.'2
The bulk of the Commission's recommendations were
9 Op. cit., supra, n. 7, page 56.
10 See note, 21 U. Cinn. L. R. 107-108 (1952) for an account of the various
methods provided for hearings before administrative agencies prior to the
passage of the Ohio Administrative Procedure Act.
11 Op. cit., supra, n. 10; n. 3.
12 Op. cit., supra, n. 10.
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adopted and embodied in the Administrative Procedure Act
which the Legislature passed in 1943,13 and strengthened by
amendment in 1945.14
The Administrative Procedure Act, as originally enacted, 15
related only to licensing agencies. But by the 1945 amendment 6
the coverage of the Act was expanded to include other agencies.
The Act, however, does not include all agencies, but only those
specifically enumerated. 17 Certain exceptions are also made as
to the application of the Act to certain agencies.' 8
The Act provides that, before an agency can adopt, amend
or rescind a rule, it must give reasonable public notice, at least
thirty days prior to the date set for a hearing. The date, time
and place of the hearing must be set forth in the notice. The
notice must also include a synopsis of the proposed rule, amend-
ment or rescission, or a general statement of the subject matter to
which it relates. Each agency must adopt a rule setting forth in
detail the method which it shall follow in giving such public
notice. The full text of the proposed rule, amendment or re-
scission must be filed for thirty days with the Secretary of State.
At the public hearing which is then held, any person affected by
the proposed action may appear and be heard, in person or by
his attorney, 19 and present his position, arguments, or conten-
tions, orally or in writing. He may offer and examine witnesses
and present evidence in opposition to such proposed action. A
full stenographic record of the hearing must be made at the
expense of the agency,
If these requirements are complied with, the agency may
issue an order adopting a rule. The effective date of such a rule
cannot be earlier than ten days after the rule has been filed
with the Secretary of State. The agency must also make a rea-
sonable effort to inform parties affected by a rule, prior to its
13 Ohio Laws 358 (1943-1944).
14 Ohio Laws 578 (1945-1946).
15 Op. cit., supra, n. 13.
16 Op. cit., supra, n. 14.
17 Ohio R. C., Sec. 119.01.
Is Ibid., n. 17.
19 Ohio R. C., Sec. 119.13 provides that at any hearing conducted by any
agency under the Administrative Procedure Act a person may be repre-
sented by an attorney or by such other representative as is lawfully per-
mitted to practice before the agency in question. However, only attorneys
at law may represent parties at a hearing where a record is taken which
may be the basis of an appeal to a court.
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effective date. The agency should also have available for dis-
tribution copies of the rule.
This procedure, however, may be circumvented, if the
Governor, upon the request of an agency, determines that an
emergency exists. The agency may then immediately adopt a
rule, amendment, or rescission, and it becomes effective as soon
as it is certified and filed with the Secretary of State. Such rule,
amendment, or rescission, becomes invalid at the end of sixty
days, unless the agency has complied with the procedure pre-
scribed by the Act for the adoption, amendment, or rescission of
rules, generally. 20
The Act makes certain other exceptions to the requirement
that a rule, to be valid, must provide an opportunity to be heard
for any person affected by such rule. These exceptions are: (1)
where an agency is required by statute to revoke a license pur-
suant to the judgment of a court; (2) where the basic statute
authorizes suspension of a license without a hearing, and (3)
where rules or statutes grant a right of appeal to higher au-
thority within the agency, or to a court with a hearing on such
appeal. Where a statute permits the suspension of a license,
however, without a prior hearing, the person to whom the order
is issued shall be allowed a hearing upon request.2 1
The Act provides that a person shall also be allowed a hear-
ing in the following instances: (1) Whenever an agency claims
that a person is required to obtain a license and the person
denies it, if requested, the agency shall allow him a hearing.
(2) Whenever any person has been refused admission to an
examination, where such examination is a prerequisite to the
issuance of a license, and a hearing was not held prior to such
refusal. (3) Whenever any licensee is required to renew his
license periodically, and such renewal is denied and a hearing
was not held prior to such denial. And (4) whenever any per-
son's application for a license or a renewal of a license has been
rejected, and a hearing was not held prior to such refusal.22
The action of any agency in rejecting an application for re-
newal of a license is not effective until fifteen days after notice
of the rejection is mailed to the applicant. Also, a licensee who
has filed his application for renewal within the time and in the
manner provided for by statute or rule of the agency, does not
20 This discussion of the procedure for adoption, amendment or rescission
of rules has been culled from Ohio R. C. Sec. 119.03.
21 Ohio R. C., Sec. 119.06.
22 Tbid., n. 21.
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have to discontinue his business or occupation, if the agency fails
to act on his application.
23
Unless a particular statute prescribes how notice shall be
given prior to the issuance of an order by an agency, the agency
is required to give notice by registered mail, return receipt re-
quested. The notice must inform the person to whom it is sent
that he is entitled to a hearing within thirty days of the time of
mailing the notice. The notice must include the charges or rea-
sons for the proposed action, and the law or rule involved. No-
tice by publication is provided for, if the registered notice is
returned undelivered. Failure to give notice, as required by the
Act, invalidates the order.24
The agency is authorized to determine the time and to
designate the place of the hearing.25 It can compel the attendance
of witnesses and the production of books and papers. It can pass
on the admissibility of evidence, and appoint referees or ex-
aminers to hold hearings.26
The Act provides that any person adversely affected by an
order of an agency, in adopting, amending or rescinding a rule,
may appeal to the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County,
on the ground that: (1) the agency failed to comply with the
law in adopting, amending, rescinding, publishing or distribut-
ing said rule; or (2) that the rule as adopted or amended by the
agency was unreasonable, or (3) that it was unlawful. Any
person who desires to appeal from an order of an agency must
file his notice of appeal with the agency, within fifteen days of
the order, and prior to the effective date of the rule, amendment
or rescission. The notice of appeal must set forth the order ap-
pealed from and the grounds of the appeal. A copy of the notice
of appeal must also be filed with the court. Within ten days
after the filing of the notice of appeal, the agency must send a
transcript of its record to the clerk of the court. Within three
days after receiving the transcript of the record, the court must
set the date, time and place for a hearing, and notify the ap-
pealing party and the agency of its action. The hearing must
then be held within twenty days after the filing of the transcript
23 Ibid., n. 21.
24 Ohio R. C., Sec. 119.01.
25 Ohio R. C., Sec. 119.05.
26 Ohio R. C., Sec. 119.09. It is gratifying to note that the referees or
examiners must be lawyers qualified to practice in the State. The fact
that they must submit written reports to the agencies, setting forth their
findings of fact and conclusions of law, as well as make a recommendation
of the action to be taken, is also heartening. It should also be mentioned
that an agency may require additional qualifications for referees or ex-
aminers, other than that required by the Act.
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of the record, and the court must render its decision within
thirty days after the hearing. Unless appealed from, the order
of the court is final. However, a person affected by such order
is not precluded from attacking it at a later date, if its applica-
tion to a particular set of facts or circumstances is unreasonable
or unlawful.
2 7
Any person adversely affected by any order of an agency, in
an adjudication proceeding, whereby an applicant has been
denied admission to an examination, or denied the issuance or re-
newal or registration of a license, or has had his license revoked
or suspended, may appeal from such order, to the Court of Com-
mon Pleas of the County in which his place of business is located
or of the county where he resides. However, appeals from the
decisions of the Board of Liquor Control may only be made to
the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County. Also, if a party
does not have a place of business in Ohio, and is not a resident,
his appeal must be made to the Court of Common Pleas of
Franklin County. Likewise, any person adversely affected by
any order of an agency, issued pursuant to any other adjudica-
tion, may only appeal to the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin
County.
The person appealing must file a notice of appeal, with the
agency, setting forth the order appealed from and the grounds of
appeal. He must also file a copy of the notice of appeal with the
court, within fifteen days after the mailing of the notice of the
agency's order. The court may grant a suspension of the agency's
order, and fix its terms, if it appears that the execution of the
agency's order would work "an unusual hardship" upon the
appealing party. Then, if a further appeal is taken from the
order of the court which had previously granted a suspension of
the agency's order, such order is not vacated, but is given full
force and effect until the matter is finally adjudicated. During
the appeal, the agency cannot deny the renewal of a license or
permit by reason of the order of suspension. However, the final
order of adjudication may apply to any renewal which has been
granted during the appeal.
Whenever a hearing is required, the agency must, within
ten days, prepare and certify to the court a complete record of
the adjudication proceedings. The cost of the record is then
taxed as part of the costs of the appeal, and the appealing party
27 Ohio R. C., Sec. 119.11.
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must provide security for such costs. If a request is made, the
agency must also furnish any interested party with a copy of
the testimony and evidence, and a copy of the complete record,
at cost.
While ordinarily the court only considers the record cer-
tified to it by the agency, it may grant a request for the admission
of additional evidence, if it is satisfied that the additional evi-
dence is newly discovered, and could not have been produced
at the hearing before the agency.
The court must give a preference to all proceedings brought
by virtue of the Act, over all other civil cases.
On appeal, the court must consider the entire record and
such additional evidence as it has admitted. If it then finds that
the order of the agency is supported by reliable, probative, and
substantial evidence, and is in accordance with law, it may af-
firm the order.2 s Otherwise it may reverse, vacate, or modify
the order, or make such other ruling as is supported by reliable,
probative, and substantial evidence and is in accordance with law.
Prior to October 21, 1953, an agency could not appeal from a
judgment of a court which vacated its decision.2 9 However, the
Act now provides for appeal by an agency.30
From all this it can be seen that most of the old abuses have
been dealt with. 1
During the last twenty-five years much attention has been
given to ways to improve the licensing administrative process.
28 For a discussion of this particular wording in the Act see Andrews v.
Board of Liquor Control, 164 Ohio St. 275 (1955).
29 Miller v. Bureau of Unemployment Compensation, 160 Ohio St. 561,
52 0. 0. 451, 117 N. E. 2d 427 (1954). See also Corn v. Board of Liquor
Control, 160 Ohio St. 9, 50 0. 0. 479, 113 N. E. 2d 360 (1953); Re Milicreek
Local Dist. High School, 160 Ohio St. 234, 52 0. 0. 91, 115 N. E. 2d 840
(1953); Re Roundhead Local Dist. High School, 160 Ohio St. 240, 52 0. 0.
94, 115 N. E. 2d 841 (1952). These cases overruled a previous Court of
Appeals decision which had permitted appeal by an agency. Board of
Liquor Control v. Tancer, 62 0. L. Abs. 360, 367, 107 N. E. 2d 532, dis-
missed for want of debatable question 158 Ohio St. 128, 48 0. 0. 63, 107
N. E. 2d 127 (1952), and Barn Cafe & Restaurant v. Board of Liquor Control,
63 0. L. Abs. 348, 107 N. E. 2d 631 (1952). However, the Supreme Court
did modify its decision, to the extent that if no objection was raised to the
prosecution of an appeal by an agency, and the court heard the matter and
rendered judgment, such judgment could not thereafter be set aside or
vacated on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the court. Mantho v.
Board of Liquor Control, 162 Ohio St. 37, 54 0. 0. 1, 120 N. E. 2d 730 (1954).
30 This discussion of appeal from an order of an agency in an adjudication
proceeding has been distilled from Ohio R. C., Sec. 119.12. It should be
noted that this section does not apply to appeals from the Department of
Taxation.
31 See, supra, at n. 3-6.
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Commencing in the early thirties, such prominent groups as the
American Bar Association, 32 the President's Committee on Ad-
ministrative Management,"3 the Attorney General's Committee
on Administrative Management 34 and the Judiciary committees
of both houses of Congress"5 made studies of the problems
created by the growth and number of federal administrative
agencies.
After many abortive efforts, a bill was finally adopted by
the Congress, only to be vetoed by President Roosevelt."6 How-
ever, in 1946 the Congress was successful and the Federal Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act was enacted.3 7
Meanwhile, state administrative practices were also being
scrutinized. The State of New York, in 1930, appointed Robert
M. Benjamin to study the functions of its administrative agencies.
The report of the Benjamin committee" pointed up the need
for procedural reform. However, the report did not recommend
a uniform procedural code.3 9
32 A Special Committee on Administrative Law was appointed by the
American Bar Association in 1932. This committee made a study of federal
administrative procedure and its report was embodied in a series of articles
published in its journal. 58 A. B. A. Rep. 407-427 (1933); 59 A. B. A. Rep.
539-564 (1934); 60 A. B. A. Rep. 136-143 (1935) and 61 A. B. A. Rep. 720-
794 (1936). Also, in 1938 the Section on Judicial Administration of the
Committee on Administrative Agencies of the American Bar Association,
under the leadership of Arthur T. Vanderbilt, issued an excellent report on
judicial review in state administrative agencies. 63 A. B. A. Rep. 623. A
second article was published in 1939. 64 A. B. A. Rep. 407. These articles
were the footings upon which the Model State Administrative Procedure
Act was built.
33 Report of President's Committee on Administrative Management (1937).
This committee was appointed by President Roosevelt in 1936, to study
federal administrative procedure. Its report was a condemnation of the
federal agencies' haphazard growth, overlapping functions and general
irresponsibility. The federal agencies, in its words, constituted, "a fourth
branch of the government for which there was no sanction in the Consti-
tution." Remedial legislation was strongly urged.
34 Report of Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure
(1941). Both the majority and minority members of the Committee issued
a report and drafts of suggested bills.
35 The Judiciary Committees of both houses of Congress had made an al-
most continuous study of the practices and procedures of the federal
administrative agencies, and had introduced a number of bills for the
Congress' consideration. All to no avail, however.
36 Walter Logan Bill, S. 915 and H. R. 624.
37 Public Law 404, 79th Cong. 2nd Sess., 60 Stat. 237, 8 U. S. C. Sections
1001-11 (Supp. 1946), Approved June 11, 1946.
38. Report on Administrative Adjudication in the State of New York, 1942.
39 The Benjamin report, as had the majority report of the U. S. Attorney
General, thought that the problems confronting administrative agencies
were too varied to be dealt with in a single procedural administrative
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From these efforts the Model State Administrative Procedure
Act was evolved.40 This model act was adopted by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1946.
The model code represents the best present thinking of many
able and learned persons. It is not a "uniform act," but instead
embodies what it considers to be basic principles of justice and
procedural fair play. These basic principles have been sum-
marized thus: (1) Requirement that each agency shall adopt
essential procedural rules and that, so far as practicable, all rule-
making, both procedural and substantive, shall be accompanied
by notice of hearing to interested persons.41 (2) Assurance of
proper publicity for administrative rules that affect the public.
42
(3) Provision for advance determination or "declaratory judg-
ments" on the validity of administrative rules, and for "declara-
tory rulings" affording advance determination of the application
of administrative rules to particular cases. 43 (4) Assurance of
fundamental fairness in administrative hearings, particularly in
regard to rules of evidence and the taking of official notice in
quasi-judicial proceedings. 44  (5) Provisions assuring personal
familiarity, on the part of the responsible deciding officers and
agency heads, with the evidence, in quasi-judicial cases decided
by them.45 (6) Assurance of proper scope of judicial review of
administrative orders, to guarantee correction of administrative
orders.
46
The Ohio Administrative Procedure Act provides all of
the basic principles of justice and fair play set forth in the
(Continued from preceding page)
code. The report said: "My description of diversity of existing procedure
has, I believe, shown more than the extent of change that a general pro-
cedural code would bring about. It has shown that much of the existing
diversity exists for reasons that are not merely valid, but inescapable.
Thus a uniform procedure would be impossible, if it were thought de-
sirable."
40 The Model Act is reprinted in its present form in the Handbook of the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 329-336
(1944). See Stason, The Model State Administrative Procedure Act, 33
Iowa L. R. 196 (1948). This article is the first of ten articles of a symposium
on state administrative law, in the January 1948 issue of the Iowa Law Re-
view.
41 Model State Administrative Procedure Act, Sec. 2.
42 Ibid., Secs. 3-4.
43 Ibid., Secs. 6, 7.
44 Ibid., Secs. 8, 9.
45 Ibid., Sec. 10.
46 Ibid., Secs. 11, 12.
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model code. It also has made generally adequate provisions for
court review to protect them. While it differs in detail from the
model act, the Ohio Act covers practically all the subjects noted
in the model code.
The Legislature, however, has severely limited the scope of
the Act. The Act only applies to the agencies specifically
enumerated in Revised Code Section 119.01. Moreover, while the
Act includes the licensing function of any agency "having the
authority or responsibility of issuing, revoking or cancelling li-
censes," 47 the actions of the Public Utilities Commission, and
certain activities of the Superintendent of Banks, Superintendent
of Building and Loan Associations, Superintendent of Insurance,
and of the Industrial Commission, are excluded. Nor does the
Act apply to the actions of the Bureau of Unemployment Com-
pensation, except that the licensing function of the Bureau is
amenable to the act.
Whether these exceptions and limitations are justified is at
least questionable. It also may be regretted that the Act does not
require a regular publication of all administrative rulings in a
single volume. I have in mind the Federal Register, where all
federal agencies are required to publish their rules and regula-
tions prior to their effective dates. Perhaps, however, such a
publication is unwarranted at this time.48 The Ohio Act, unlike
the model code, does not provide for declaratory judgments to
test the validity of rules or of their application. However, it
does provide that any person adversely affected by an order of
an agency may appeal to a court from such an order.49 This pro-
vision of the Act provides an adequate substitute for a declara-
tory judgment proceeding.
The Ohio Administrative Procedure Acthas brought rela-
tive order to an increasingly important area of State regulation.
It has, for the most part, eliminated the major abuses of the
licensing processes which brought the Act into being. Much still
needs to be done, but much has been accomplished.
47 Ohio R. C., Sec. 119.01.
48 Pennsylvania had such a law. Penna. Stat. Ann. 71, Sect. 1710-10, 1710-104.
It was repealed, however, in 1947. Penna. Laws, No. 509 (1947).
49 Ohio R. C., Sec. 119.11.
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